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Abstract 
Regression techniques are applied to an unbalanced panel data that includes 82 countries observed over 
a ten-year period, to explore the factors that affect non-life insurance demand across nations. While 
previous literature has discovered several significant economic, demographic, and institutional variables, 
little attention has been devoted to cultural dimensions. We find that non-life insurance consumption is 
adversely impacted in countries where a large fraction of the population has Islamic beliefs. Also highly 
significant are three of the cultural scores developed by Hofstede in a celebrated study: Power Distance, 
Individualism, and Uncertainty Avoidance. A conjecture that culture impacts non-life insurance more in 
affluent countries receives ample statistical support, with an adjusted R-square coefficient increasing by 
20%. These results have implications for multinational insurers seeking to enter a new market. Ceteris 
Paribus, these insurers should target countries, and population segments within these countries, that 
exhibit low Power Distance, and high Individualism and Uncertainty Avoidance scores. 
 
1. Introduction 
Numerous publications in insurance journals explore the determinants of insurance consumption, and 
attempt to find variables that significantly impact life and non-life insurance purchases. All studies 
implicitly assume that policyholders are making rational decisions, maximizing benefits to dependents 
after death and protecting their assets, and focus on economic determinants such as income, legal 
system, and education using international panel data. However, it may be unreasonable to expect such a 
high degree of competence and rationality on the part of insureds confronted with the purchase of very 
complex and abstracts products. It may very well be that national culture has a strong impact on 
insurance purchase decisions. Humans do not share the same decision-making process when facing 
economic decisions. Consumers may respond to insurance solicitations according to their cultural beliefs, 
not only on economic rationality.  
The main purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, we explore national culture as potential 
determinant of non-life insurance consumption. Hofstede (1983, 2001) provides four cultural dimensions 
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that can describe cross-cultural differences across different countries: Individualism, Power Distance, 
Masculinity / Feminity, and Uncertainty Avoidance. We test the effect of these four cultural measures on 
non-life insurance demand using a large international panel data that includes 82 countries over a ten-
year period. We also introduce affiliation to one of the world’s largest religions as cultural variables.  
Second, we investigate the importance of economic and cultural factors on non-life insurance demand at 
different stages of economic development. From Figure 1A, a positive relationship between GDP and 
non-life insurance penetration emerges, as reported in all previous literature. However, the relationship 
deteriorates in richer countries; it even totally breaks down among economies with GDP greater than 
$20,000, as shown in Figure 1B. Beenstock et al (1988) observe a similar phenomenon, but do not 
investigate it further, relegating it to further reserach. We subdivide our sample into developing and 
developed nations and investigate whether national culture can explain a substantial part of the residual 
insurance demand variations among developed countries.   
The paper is organized as follows. The literature review is section 2 is followed by our lists of 
variables in section 3. Section 4 presents our data and methodology. Results are discussed in section 5.  
Section 6 provides our summary and conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review 
A large body of insurance research applies econometric models to select the most appropriate factors 
that explain variations in the demand for life insurance across countries, with, as most frequently cited 
papers, Beck and Webb (2003), Browne and Kim (1993), and Outreville (1996). The dependent variables 
for the vast majority of models are the life insurance density (number of US Dollars spent annually on life 
insurance per capita) and the life insurance penetration (total life premium volume divided by GDP), 
published annually in Swiss Re’s publication Sigma. Explanatory variables that have been shown to 
significantly impact life insurance demand are GDP per capita, inflation (real, anticipated, or feared), 
development of the banking sector, institutional indicators (such as investors protection, contract 
enforcement, and political stability), and whether Islam is the dominant religion or not. Variables that 
appear to have a borderline impact include education, old and/or young dependency ratio (ratio of the 
population above the age of 65, or below 15, to the number of persons age 15 to 64), urbanization, size 
of the social security system, life expectancy, and market structure.   
 In a couple of important papers, Chui and Kwok (2008, 2009) demonstrate that the inclusion of 
cultural factors in the set of explanatory variables greatly improves the predictive ability of regression 
analyses. Using an unbalanced panel data of 41 countries observed from 1976 to 2001, they include in 
their models four cultural variables introduced by Hofstede (1983, 2001) in a series of celebrated studies: 
Individualism, Power Distance, Masculinity, and Uncertainty Avoidance. They find the first three variables 
to be highly significant. The results prove to be robust, even after controlling for economic, institutional, 
and demographic factors such as GDP per capita, inflation, bank sector and stock market development, 
creditors rights, contract enforcement quality, dependency ratio, and religion. For instance, the inclusion 
of just one cultural variable, Individualism, increases the adjusted R2 from 0.70 to 0.83 – a highly 
significant improvement.   
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 Compared with the voluminous literature on life insurance country variations, very little 
empirical research has been devoted to the determinants of the demand for property-casualty insurance.  
In a cross-sectional analysis of consumption patterns limited to automobile insurance in 359 townships of 
the state of Massachusetts in 1979, Sherden (1984) finds that the demand for motor insurance is 
generally inelastic with respect to price and income, and that the demand for comprehensive and 
collision coverage increases substantially with increased population density. In a first international study 
using Swiss Re data, Beenstock et al (1988) investigate the relationship between property-liability 
premiums per capita and GDP per capita for 45 countries in 1981. A log-linear model proves a strongly 
significant positive relationship, with an income elasticity exceeding unity: non-life insurance is a superior 
good, disproportionately represented in economic growth. The relationship between income and 
premiums, however, seems to deteriorate as countries get richer. Outreville (1990) uses a cross-sectional 
logarithmic model of non-life insurance penetration for 55 developing countries that confirm the 
Beenstock et al (1988) main result of an income elasticity greater than unity. The level of financial 
development is the only other factor found to significantly impact non-life insurance.  
 Browne et al (2000) study 22 OECD countries from 1987 through 1993 and focus on the premium 
density of two lines of insurance: motor vehicle (usually purchased by households) and general liability 
(normally bought by businesses). Panel data analysis demonstrates that income (GDP per capita), wealth, 
foreign firms market share, and the form of legal system (civil law or common law) are significant factors 
to explain the purchase of the two types of insurance.  Per capita income has a much greater impact on 
motor insurance than on general liability. Esho et al (2004) expand the work of Browne et al (2000) by 
using a larger set of countries, and by introducing the origin of the legal system and a measure of 
property rights in their model. Dummy variables, characterizing the English, French, German, and 
Scandinavian legal system origin, are found to have an insignificant effect. Results show a robust 
relationship between the protection of property rights and insurance consumption, as well as a 
significant effect of loss probability and income. Esho et al (2004) also include one of Hofstede’s 
dimensions, Uncertainty Avoidance, as a proxy for risk aversion. They find a marginally positive 
relationship and conclude that culture does not seem to play an important role in non-life insurance 
demand.  
 Park et al (2002) examine the impact of culture on insurance pervasiveness, defined as the 
combined penetration of life and non-life insurance. Four of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are included 
in the panel regression analysis in addition to GNP, socio-political stability, and economic freedom.  In 
contrast with the life insurance demand studies of Chui and Kwok (2008, 2009), results show that only 
Masculinity is positively correlated with insurance pervasiveness. This conflicting result may be due to the 
aggregation of life and non-life insurance, which may produce a bias against finding meaningful 
relationships if the cultural impact on insurance demand is different for life and non-life insurance.  Also, 
Park et al (2002) only have three other control variables in their regression model; they did not include 
life- or non life-specific control factors. The low number of controls may cause an omitted variable 
problem and result in biased coefficient estimates.     
 
3. Variables 
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Our study, devoted to the impact of cultural variables on non-life insurance purchases, uses an extensive 
number of explanatory variables. Most variables, for instance market concentration and GDP per capita, 
are provided on an annual basis from 1999 to 2008 for 82 countries, with a population of 5.67 billion 
representing 82.7% of the world’s total. Other variables, like the legal system and cultural measures, do 
not evolve over time and are presented as a single time-invariant number. Table 1 summarizes variable 
definitions and provides all sources.   
3.1. Dependent Variables 
1. The Non-Life Insurance Penetration (PEN). In its annual study of world insurance markets, the Swiss 
Reinsurance Company ranks over 85 countries according to Non-Life Insurance Penetration: non-life 
insurance premiums, as a percentage of GDP. 
2. The Non-Life Insurance Density, at Purchasing Power Parity (DEN). Density, defined as premium per 
capita in US dollars, is also published annually by Swiss Re. To better reflect cost of living differences, we 
applied a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) correction to the density. Premiums per capita can be converted 
to US Dollars either using market currency exchange rates, or at PPP. The use of market rates can lead to 
misleading conclusions when comparing per-capita living conditions across countries. Economists prefer 
to correct the data by a PPP factor that attempts to reflect the differences in prices and services between 
a country and the United States. The PPP correction can be significant, with maximum values exceeding 
five for countries like Angola or Ukraine. 
 Nearly every single international comparative study uses insurance density and penetration as 
dependent variables. We correct density to better reflect purchasing power. These variables have the 
advantage of being easily available, annually, for a large number of countries. Swiss Re puts in a lot of 
effort in reconciling the different valuation techniques used around the world, and standardizes the data 
by providing figures that are gross of reinsurance and commissions. A disadvantage of density and 
penetration is that they add up premiums across various lines of insurance. In some countries motor 
insurance is the dominant non-life policy, while other nations emphasize more liability insurance.  
Aggregate premiums result in a loss of information, reducing the likelihood that significant explanatory 
variables will be discovered. 
 Density and penetration measure slightly different effects. Penetration measures life insurance 
consumption relative to the size of the economy, while density compares life insurance purchases across 
countries without adjusting for income. High GDP countries will spend more on insurance in absolute 
terms, as they have more assets to protect. We therefore expect a very high correlation between 
insurance density and GDP – indeed one of the reasons for the paucity of research in determinants of 
non-life insurance may have been a belief that purchases are driven by wealth and little else.  
Penetration measures relative insurance consumption, as the overall wealth effect has been removed 
through division by GDP per capita. It measures how wealth is allocated to insurance in relative terms: 
two countries with similar GDP per capita may exhibit different insurance consumption patterns, an 
effect captured by penetration and not by density. For this reason we consider penetration to be our 
primary variable, and use density only for robustness checks. 
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Explanatory Variables 
Economic and Institutional Variables 
3. The Gross Domestic Product per capita, at Purchasing Power Parity (GDP). All previous studies, whether 
devoted to life or non-life insurance, conclude that income, measured as GDP per capita, is the most 
important factor affecting purchasing decisions. Obviously, increased income allows for higher 
consumption in general, makes insurance more affordable, and creates a greater demand for non-life 
insurance to safeguard acquired property. We expect income to have a strong, positive impact on non-
life insurance demand. 
4. Urbanization: percentage of population living in urban areas (URBAN). Several authors suggest that 
urbanization could be an important determinant for non-life insurance demand, for a variety of reasons.  
Sherden (1984) expects urban dwellers to perceive a higher risk of car accidents and thefts. Browne et al 
(2000) observe that urban concentration increases the rate of interaction among individuals, with more 
activities undertaken in close proximity to neighbors, and consequently use urbanization as a proxy for 
loss probability. According to Esho et al (2004), there is a greater concentration of assets in urban areas, 
leading to increased opportunities for crime and for evading detection. Hwang and Gao (2003) observe 
that many countries are facing a transition from an agricultural to an industrialized society. The city then 
becomes the center of economic development, with great impact on traditional values and perception of 
risk. Families become smaller, economic security in the form of informal agreements within a family or 
village no longer exists, so additional sources of financial security are needed. Life and non-life insurance 
are efficient tools to provide this security. Also, the concentration of potential customers in a small 
geographic area such as a city simplifies the marketing and distribution of insurance. We expect the 
degree of urbanization of a country to be positively related to its consumption of non-life insurance. 
5. Education: percentage of population enrolled in third-level education (EDUC). Several authors [Browne 
and Kim (1993), Browne et al (2000), Esho (2004)] use the level of education in a country as a proxy for 
risk aversion. Our perspective is that education increases the awareness of risk and enables a better 
assessment of threats to financial stability. Educated people are more able to understand the benefits of 
insurance. Along with most authors [Browne and Kim (1993), Browne et al (1993), Esho et al (2004), 
Outreville (1990, 1996), Truett and Truett (1990)] we expect a country’s level of education to be 
positively correlated with demand for non-life insurance. 
6. Market concentration: sum of squared market shares of ten largest non-life insurance companies 
(HERF). Competition forces down the price of insurance, and makes it more affordable. Outreville’s (1996) 
main conclusion is that a monopolistic market has a negative effect on life insurance growth. Browne et 
al (2000) use the market share held by foreign insurers as a proxy for insurance price. The availability of 
market shares for large companies allows us to define a better proxy variable for competition, in the 
form of a modified Herfindahl index: sum of squared markets shares of the ten largest insurers. Given 
that a high index means low insurer concentration and less competition, we expect a negative 
relationship between our measure of concentration and the demand for non-life insurance. 
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7. The legal system in force (COMMON). While every country has its own specific legal rules, scholars 
broadly subdivide all legal systems of the world in two families. Civil Law systems originated with Roman 
Law and the Napoleonic Code, and were spread around the world by France through conquest, 
colonization, cultural dominance, and imitation. Common Law systems are based on British law, and are 
in force in countries that were colonized or heavily influenced by England.   
 Some legal research [La Porta (1998), Min (2006), Posner (2004)] claims that Common Law is 
more conducive to economic development than Civil Law. Common Law countries generally have higher 
law enforcement quality and stronger legal protection of creditors and investors. Common Law's reliance 
on judicial opinion may contribute to commercial growth, as precedents provide reasonable guidance on 
issues and more certainty of outcome in case of a dispute. By contrast, in Civil Law countries, consistency 
is not guaranteed as judges must rule anew on each issue. As a result Common Law countries adapt more 
rapidly to changing conditions and new opportunities.   
 The legal system in force in a country may impact the development of insurance, as it specifies 
the liabilities of those responsible of damage, and defines the business environment of insurers (Browne 
et al, 2000). For instance, the United States leads the world in per capita consumption of liability 
insurance. The American legal system may be a contributing factor, by encouraging Americans to over-
consume property-liability insurance (Syverud et al, 1994). Browne et al (2008) find the legal system to 
be a significant factor in the development of non-life insurance. Esho et al (2004) also investigate the 
impact of the legal system, but find it non-significant after controlling for income and property rights.  
Recently, Park et al (2010) showed that the use of a Common Law legal system is the most important 
determinant of toughness of bonus-malus systems in automobile insurance. We expect the development 
of non-life insurance to be positively related to Common Law, a time-invariant dummy variable. 
8. The Political Risk Index (PRISK). Countries with little political and investment risk are more likely to 
have developed insurance markets, as the financial environment is more conducive to foreign 
investment, and financial contracts such as insurance policies are easier to enforce. The Political Risk 
Services Group publishes an International Country Risk Guide, rating most nations around the world 
according to political, financial, and economic risk. The Political Risk Index (that could also be called the 
Risk Index for International Business) is the outcome of a statistical model that analyzes the potential 
risks of international business operations. Countries receive scores on twelve risk components – that 
could each be considered as a potential explanatory variable. 
 government stability (government unity, legislative strength, popular support) 
 socioeconomic conditions (unemployment, consumer confidence, poverty) 
 investment profile (contract viability, expropriation risk, profit repatriation, payment delays) 
 internal conflict (civil war threat, political violence, civil disorder) 
 external conflict (war, cross-border conflict, foreign pressures) 
 corruption 
 military interference in politics 
 religious tensions 
 law and order (strength and impartiality of judicial system, popular observance of the law) 
 ethnic tensions 
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 democratic accountability 
 bureaucratic quality.  
 
The twelve measures of the Political Risk Index are highly correlated, with numerous correlation 
coefficients in excess of 0.6. Introducing all of these potential explanatory variables in the same 
regression model would lead to severe multicollinearity problems and reduce the power of the 
regression. We therefore applied a Principal Components Analysis to summarize the twelve scores, and 
used the primary factor in all our regressions. This primary factor has a very large eigenvalue of 5.49 and 
explains 46% of the total variance of all PRS scores. 
 
Cultural variables 
 
9. Religion: percentage of individuals with Buddhist, Christian, or Islamic beliefs (BUDD, CHRT, MUSLIM).  
Zelizer (1979) notes that, historically, religion has opposed life insurance. Some religious people believe 
that reliance on insurance to protect one’s life or property results from distrust in God’s protective care.  
Until the 19th century, several European nations condemned and banned life insurance on religious 
grounds. Religious antagonism to insurance is still quite prevalent in many Islamic countries. In addition, 
the religious inclination of a population may affect its risk aversion (Beck and Webb, 2003). Browne and 
Kim (1993) find Islamic beliefs to significantly decrease life insurance purchases. We expect a high 
percentage of religious people in a country to negatively affect insurance purchases, especially in Islamic 
countries. 
10. Hofstede cultural variables. In a celebrated study, Hofstede (1983) analyzed the answers of 116,000 
cultural survey questionnaires collected within subsidiaries of a large multinational business organization, 
in 64 countries. Four cultural dimensions of national culture emerged from the study, which collectively 
explain 49% of the variance in the survey data:  
 Power Distance (PDI) is the degree of inequality among people which the population of a country 
considers as normal. Scores of all countries on all cultural dimensions can be found under 
http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php. Countries scoring high on Power 
Distance include China, Mexico, India, and the Arab World. Israel, New Zealand, Ireland, 
Scandinavian countries receive low scores. The Power Distance index attempts to capture 
differences in how nations deal with inequality in wealth, power, and privileges. High Power 
Distance countries accept these inequalities more easily, and agree to a high degree of 
centralization of authority and autocratic leadership. According to Chui and Kwok (2008), in high 
Power Distance nations, individuals surrender power and authority readily, but expect in return 
their superiors to be mindful of their welfare and take actions to reduce their risk, thereby 
reducing the need for insurance. We expect the impact of Power Distance on insurance 
consumption to be slightly negative.   
 
 Individualism (IDV) measures the degree to which people in a country prefer to act as individuals 
rather than as members of groups. Examples of countries with high Individualism are the US, the 
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UK, Australia, and the Netherlands. China, South Korea, Thailand, Pakistan, and Central American 
countries are at the other end of the scale (Collectivism). In individualistic countries ties between 
individuals are loose: people are not expected to care much about persons beyond their 
immediate family. Collectivist societies are integrated into strong groups, beginning with the 
extended family, and unquestioned protection and loyalty among members of the group is 
expected. People with an individual mindset tend to rely more on insurance for protection and 
less on network financial security. We expect the insurance consumption of a country to be 
positively related to its level of Individualism.  
 
 Masculinity (MAS) evaluates whether biological gender differences impact roles in social 
activities. High-masculinity countries include Japan, Switzerland, Austria, and Venezuela.  
Sweden, South Korea, Uruguay, Portugal, have high-feminity values. Some societies allow men 
and women nearly equal access to all occupations and roles. Others keep a sharp distinction 
between what men and women should do. In that case, men are given the more dominant and 
assertive roles in society, and women the more caring and service-oriented roles. In masculine 
societies, performing, achieving, making money, are given paramount importance. In feminine 
societies, helping others and the environment, having warm relationships, minding the quality of 
life, are key values. In life insurance, Chui and Kwok (2008) find that feminine societies purchase 
more insurance, as these societies are very sensitive to the needs of their families and want to 
protect them against the financial consequences of an untimely death. The effect of Masculinity / 
Feminity on non-life insurance purchases may be ambiguous. Masculine societies may buy more 
insurance to be more in control of their future – a factor that may outweigh the higher level of 
care of feminine societies.  
 
 Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) scores tolerance for uncertainty. Japan, Russia, Belgium, Greece, 
and Spain are uncertainty-avoiding countries. Singapore, Sweden, Hong Kong, and the UK, are 
among the uncertainty-seeking nations. The Uncertainty Avoidance index assesses the extent to 
which people feel threatened by uncertainty and ambiguity, and try to avoid these situations. It 
measures the degree of preference for structured situations, with clear rules as to how one 
should behave. Societies try to cope with uncertainty by introducing laws, rules, regulations, 
religion in a broad sense, and technology. Uncertainty-avoiding societies promote employment 
stability, select managers on the basis of seniority, are suspicious towards foreigners as 
managers, and rely excessively on external consultants. People from societies with a high 
Uncertainty Avoidance index use more mineral water, consume less frozen foods, buy their cars 
new, avoid large do-it-yourself projects at home, and prefer skill and strategic contests over 
games of chance. They invest less in stocks. Note that, while Hofstede’s concept of Uncertainty 
Avoidance is correlated with insurance researchers’ measure of risk aversion, it is far from being 
identical. Risk avoiders are willing to pay a premium to reduce risk in their lives, uncertainty 
avoiders have other goals: they exhibit a strong preference for a well-structured, predictable 
society with clear rules and expectations. Still, we expect that uncertainty-avoidance countries 
tend to have a more developed insurance market. 
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The hypothesized relationships between non-life insurance consumption and our explanatory 
variables are summarized in Table 2. 
 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
Swiss Re’ studies annually include over 85 countries, based on a minimum premium threshold.  
Hofstede’s 1983 study provides scores for his four cultural variables for 66 countries and three regions 
(the Arab World, East Africa, West Africa), for a total of 80 countries. Several previous articles use 
databases that are overloaded with OECD countries. In order to avoid that potential issue, we have 
assigned cultural values to several countries from regions poorly represented in the dataset, based on 
their neighbors. For instance, we have given Bahrain, Jordan, Omar, and Qatar the same cultural scores 
as other countries from the Arab World. We have assigned Latvia and Lithuania the scores of Estonia.3 
Values for all other explanatory variables were found in international databases. Due to rare missing 
observations of insurance density and penetration, this resulted in an unbalanced panel data including 82 
countries observed during the ten-year period [1999 – 2008]. 
 Panel data analysis uses at the same time the cross-sectional and time series aspects of the data, 
an approach which increases dramatically the number of observations, and consequently the degree of 
freedom of tests and the significance of results, while reducing collinearity. The pooling of times series 
and cross-sectional data allows us to make inferences about a particular country based on observations 
from other countries, resulting in more accurate predictions.   
 Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for all variables. Table 4 provides correlations. Due to the 
high positive skewness and non-normality of insurance density and penetration, GDP per capita, and the 
modified Herfindahl index, these variables have been transformed logarithmically.   
  
 Our basic model is described by the following equation: 
Insit = α + β1 Xit,Econ + β2 Yi, Inst + β3 PRIN + β4 Zi, Cult + γ DYear + εit 
where Insit is the non-life insurance consumption (natural logarithm of density or penetration) for 
country i in year t. Xit,Econ is an array of economic variables (GDP, Urbanization, Market Concentration, 
and Education) that vary with country and time. Yi, Inst is a vector of institutional variables (Legal system) 
that vary across countries, but remain constant over time. PRIN is the first principal component 
summarizing the PRS scores. Zi, Cult is an array of cultural variables (Hofstede measures, religion) that are 
country-dependent but time invariant. β1, β2, β3, and β4 are vectors of coefficients corresponding to 
                                                          
3
 We ran all analyses without these approximations to check whether they bias our results, especially in the low 
GDP subgroup analysis. Results are very robust.   
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these variables. DYear is an array of annual dummy variables used to estimate the effect of time on 
insurance purchases, with γ the corresponding regression coefficient. εit is the error term for country i in 
year t.   
 
5. Results 
Main regression results are presented in Table 5. We use Huber-White’s estimators4 in our tests to allow 
for possible heterogeneity in the error structure.  Independence is still assumed but observations may 
have different variance. Year dummies proved to be consistently insignificant and are included but not 
reported in all tables. In column (1), only economic and institutional variables were used. An adjusted R-
square coefficient of 0.534 results from the very strong influence of GDP, Common Law, market 
concentration, and political risk. Signs of regression coefficients all conform to our predictions: a higher 
income per capita, a low degree of political risk, a market that is not highly concentrated, and the use of a 
Common Law legal system, all lead to highly significant increases in non-life insurance demand. Contrary 
to our expectations, higher urbanization levels and third-level education did not significantly impact 
insurance consumption; these variables are highly correlated with income, and log GDP proves to be the 
best summary variable for this effect. Column (2) includes our first cultural variable, percentage of 
Muslims, and demonstrates the powerful negative effect of Islamic beliefs in insurance. The adjusted R-
square increases by 4.9% following the addition of this single variable. The percentage of the population 
with Christian or Buddhist beliefs did not prove to have a significant impact, so we excluded these two 
religious variables from our base regression model and provide full regression result as a robustness 
check.   
 Column (3) includes in the model specification the four Hofstede variables. All are significant at 
the 1% level, with regression coefficients signs according to predictions. Power Distance has a negative 
impact on non-life insurance sales, Individualism and Uncertainty Avoidance a positive influence. Our 
hypothesized relationship concerning Masculinity / Feminity was ambiguous: our results show a 
significant domination of the masculine side.  In life insurance, Chui and Kwok (2008) found dominance of 
the feminine side. It may be that feminine societies are more sensitive to the risk of early deaths for 
family members and purchase more life insurance, while masculine societies are more oriented towards 
goods they want to protect, and buy non-life products. All together, the four Hofstede variables increase 
the adjusted R-square coefficient by 6%.  The partial F-test for the null hypothesis that, combined, the 
Hofstede variables have no impact, leads to a huge F-statistic exceeding 25 and rejection at all 
significance levels. 
 Column (4) summarizes the full model that includes all significant cultural variables: Muslim 
percentage and the Hofstede cultural variables. All cultural variables are highly significant, with the 
exception of Masculinity / Feminity, only significant at the 10% level despite the large number of 
observations. Among the economic variables, income (log GDP) is still positive but has lost all 
                                                          
4
 We used STATA’s “robust” option to obtain this robust variance estimation.   
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significance, being highly correlated with urbanization, education, and political risk. The inclusion of the 
five cultural variables raises the adjusted R-square coefficient from 0.534 to 0.635, a considerable 10.1% 
increase that amply demonstrates that culture does matter in non-life insurance markets in a key way. 
 Given the high correlation between several economic / institutional variables, a more 
parsimonious model is presented in column (5): urbanization, education, and the political risk score are 
deleted. GDP then becomes highly significant. The adjusted R-square barely suffers from the deletion of 
three variables. The regression coefficient for the Masculinity / Feminity dimension does not differ 
significantly from zero, indicating that the impact of this factor, if any, is very small. 
 In table 6, all countries have been subdivided into low- and high-income, with a GDP of $20,000 
as cut-off point.  Results do not change markedly if the cut-off point is changed. The rationale behind this 
division is that, while culture permeates all aspects of life in all layers of societies, its influence on 
insurance can only be felt after basic needs, such as food, clothing, and shelter, are satisfied. Insurance is 
not a primary good – it is not needed when there are no assets to protect. Only once a given wealth level 
has been attained can insurance compete with other secondary goods such as brand name clothing and 
flat-screen TVs, and cultural preferences will surface. Consequently, we expect to find a stronger cultural 
influence and a weaker income effect in richer countries. 
 Results fully confirm this conjecture. For low-income countries [columns (1) to (4)] only Muslim 
percentage and Power Distance are significant among cultural variables. Individualism, Uncertainty 
Avoidance, and Masculinity are not even significant at the 10% level. The inclusion of all five cultural 
variables only raises the adjusted R-square coefficient from 0.548 to 0.575, a meager 2.7% increase. A 
totally different picture emerges for the high-income countries [columns (5) to (8)].  With the exception 
of Masculinity, all cultural variables are significant. Muslim percentage raises the adjusted R-square 
coefficient from 0.456 to 0.512 (a 5.6% increase), the Hofstede variables raise it to 0.638 (an 18.2% 
jump). Combined the five cultural variables bring the adjusted R-square coefficient to 0.661, a 
spectacular 20.5%, demonstrating the tremendous impact of culture on insurance purchases for those 
whose income allows them to make choices among non-essential goods.  
 A variety of robustness tests are summarized in table 7. Several alternative panel regression 
estimation techniques were used to examine the sensitivity of our results to the selected estimation 
method. We also checked if cultural variables impact the other common measure of insurance demand, 
density. In column (1), the Fama-MacBeth regression model was applied to check for possible within year 
cross-sectional correlations of error terms. This technique runs the same regression model on an annual 
basis; each regression coefficient is the average of the ten annual coefficients. In column (2), the Cluster 
option in STATA was used to take into account a possible within-country clustered error structure. 
Indeed, an upward bias in t-statistics may occur if residuals of some countries in GLS regression are 
correlated.  The Cluster option allows for this possibility. Column (3) provides robust regression results, 
using the “rreg” (robust regression) command in STATA, which uses an iteratively re-weighted least-
squares estimation approach to accommodate outliers or non-normality problems (Hamilton, 2003). 
Different weights are assigned to observations based on specific criteria; some outliers may be excluded 
from the sample. Column (4) presents the results of a random effect panel regression, to account for the 
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fact that country-specific effects may still be present despite the use of annual dummy variables. A 
random effect model reduces the possible autocorrelation problem that these effects may create. 
Column (4) presents the regression model that uses log (density) instead of log (penetration) as 
dependent variables. Finally, column (6) is the full regression model that includes all variables – with the 
exception of the year dummies. 
 The robustness checks confirm the conclusions obtained in previous models: cultural variables 
add considerable explanatory power to all regressions. While adherence to Christian or Buddhist beliefs 
has no demonstrated impact on insurance demand, a large percentage of believers in the Muslim faith 
strongly interferes with the development of non-life insurance. Among the cultural variables designed by 
Hofstede, Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance are consistently significant at the 1% level in all 
model specifications. Individualism has the predicted positive effect, but with a level of significance that 
varies – up to the point of non-significance in some models. Finally, the effect of Masculinity / Feminity 
remains ambiguous, and is in any case very small. 
 
6. Conclusion and Discussion 
A large body of literature attempts to explain the determinants of life and non-life insurance purchase 
across nations. Researchers have mostly focused on economic, demographic, and institutional variables, 
and shown that high income per capita, low inflation, political stability, a developed banking sector, and 
good protection of investors and creditors, are conducive to higher demand for insurance. In life 
insurance, Chui and Kwok (2008, 2009) included four cultural variables defined by Hofstede (1983, 2001) 
among their set of explanatory variables. Their analysis demonstrates that three cultural dimensions 
(Individualism, Power Distance, and Masculinity) greatly improve the predictive ability of models, after 
controlling for several factors such as GDP per capita, inflation, bank sector and stock market 
development, creditors rights, contract enforcement quality, dependency ratio, and religion. 
 Our research focused on non-life insurance. Along with several economic and institutional 
controls, we included in our set of explanatory variables religion (percentage of the population adhering 
to Buddhism, Christianity, or Islam) and the Hofstede cultural variables (Individualism, Power Distance, 
Masculinity, and Uncertainty Avoidance). We applied several regression methods to an unbalanced 
international panel data comprising 82 countries observed from 1999 to 2008. The dependent variable 
was the logarithm of penetration, the fraction of GDP devoted to non-life insurance. Empirical findings 
for the most part conformed to our theoretical predictions. GDP per capita, urbanization, education, a 
measure of market concentration, and a principal component summarizing twelve political risk scores, all 
proved to be highly significant in affecting non-life insurance sales. While Christian and Buddhist values 
do not appear to have any impact, the development of insurance markets is profoundly negatively 
affected by Islamic beliefs. Among the Hofstede cultural variables, Power Distance, Individualism, and 
Uncertainty Avoidance prove to be highly significant. Whether a country exhibits masculine or feminine 
cultural values has at most a borderline impact on insurance.   
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 Our results are amplified when our panel is subdivided into low- and high-income nations, with a 
GDP per capita $20,000 as cut-off income. While cultural values are probably similar among the poor and 
the rich in a given country, they can only affect insurance decisions once an income threshold has been 
reached. Basic needs in terms of housing, clothing, and food, need to be satisfied before insurance 
decisions are contemplated. Above the threshold, insurance has to compete against other non-essential 
goods such as a brand-name car, an I-Pad, or leisure travel. We thus conjectured that the impact of 
cultural variables would be primarily found in richer countries. 
 Empirical findings amply confirmed these predictions. For high-income countries, the adjusted R-
square coefficient, that stood at 0.456 with all economic and institutional variables in the model, jumped 
to 0.661 when cultural variables were introduced, a spectacular increase of 20.1%. In other words, 38% 
of the unexplained variation in insurance demand across affluent countries is eliminated by culture. The 
corresponding percentage is much smaller for low-income countries: 6%. 
 Most variables are significant at the 1% level. These findings are all the more impressive as the  
unavoidable use of national statistics, that implicitly assume that mean national values are representative 
of a typical household and that the inhabitants of a country are homogeneous, reduces the chances of 
discovering meaningful relationships. Also, the use of insurance penetration that aggregates all lines of 
non-life insurance, those purchased by individuals (such as motor insurance) and those bought by 
corporations (liability policies), also reduces the significance of all variables. 
 For affluent countries, the regression coefficients for the most significant cultural variables, 
Power Distance and Individualism, average 0.8%. This means that annual insurance consumption, as 
measured by the logarithm of penetration, will increase by 8% for every ten-point change in the Hofstede 
score for these variables. Scores on Individualism range from 6 (Guatemala) to 90 (Australia).  Scores on 
Power Distance range from 13 (Israel) to 104 (Malaysia).   
 Our results have several implications for multinational insurance companies seeking to enter a 
new market. While it is fairly obvious that these insurers should consider countries with low political risk, 
increasing income, and educated citizens, this research demonstrates that culture should also be 
incorporated in the decision process. Non-life insurance demands in emerging countries that score low 
on Power Distance, and high in Individualism and Uncertainty Avoidance have higher growth potential 
than other developing countries at equal levels of income, market concentration, and political risk, as 
their economies become more affluent. Within heterogeneous countries such as China, market 
segmentation strategies should direct foreign insurers to aim their promotional efforts at segments of 
the population that exhibit the best scores on the cultural variables.  
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Table 1: Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable Abbreviation Description Time-
sensitive? 
Source 
Density DEN Non-life insurance premium 
per capita adjusted for 
Purchasing Power Parity 
Yes Sigma, Swiss Re. PPP factors from IMF 
Penetration PEN Non-life insurance premiums 
divided by GDP 
Yes Sigma, Swiss Re 
Income per 
capita 
GDP GDP corrected for Purchasing 
Power Parity 
Yes World Economic Outlook database, IMF 
Urbanization URBAN Percentage of population 
living in urban areas 
Yes World Development Indicators, World 
Bank 
Education EDUC Percentage of population 
enrolled in third level 
education 
Yes http://www.barrolee.com/ 
Market 
Concentration 
HERF Modified Herfindahl Index: 
sum of market shares of ten 
largest non life insurance 
companies 
Yes International Insurance Fact Book, 
Insurance Information Institute 
Legal System COMMON Dummy variables 
characterizing countries with 
a Common Law legal system 
No The World Factbook, CIA 
Political Risk 
Index 
PRISK Political stability score based 
on a weighted average of 12 
components 
Yes International Country Risk Guide, 
Political Risk Group 
Religion BUDD, CHRT, 
MUSLIM 
Percentage of individuals with 
Christian, Buddhist, and 
Islamic beliefs 
No The World Factbook, CIA 
Power 
Distance 
PDI Cultural variable measuring 
inequality among people 
No http://www.geert-
hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php 
Individualism IDV Cultural variable measuring 
individual vs. collective 
behavior 
No http://www.geert-
hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php 
Masculinity MAS Cultural variable measuring 
masculine vs. feminine 
attitudes 
No http://www.geert-
hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
UAI Cultural variable measuring 
tolerance for uncertainty 
No http://www.geert-
hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php 
     
Time-sensitive variables are collected annually from 1999 to 2008.  Time-insensitive variables are 
constant during the 10-year period. 
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Table 2: Hypothesized relationships for all explanatory variables 
Variable Expected effect on insurance consumption 
Income per capita Positive 
Urbanization Positive 
Education Positive 
Market Concentration Negative 
Common Law Positive 
Political Risk Positive 
Buddhist Beliefs Negative 
Christian Beliefs Negative 
Islamic Beliefs Negative 
Power Distance Negative 
Individualism Positive 
Masculinity Ambiguous 
Uncertainty Avoidance Positive 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Median Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness 
Dependent variables 
Penetration 770 2.01 1.87 1.12 0.18 8.7 1.04 
Density 770 421.86 213.41 463.60 1.40 3,463.66 1.82 
 
Explanatory variables 
Income 820 17,681 12,656 14,490 796 86,008 1.29 
Urbanization 820 67.38 68.50 19.38 10.56 100.00 -0.66 
Education 790 10.06 8.91 6.40 0.48 30.6 0.66 
Market concentration 808 0.12 0.075 0.13 0.00 1 3.59 
Common Law 820 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 1.54 
Political risk score (first 
principal component) 
820 0.00 0.12 2.34 -6.34 4.17 -0.34 
Christianity % 820 56.96 74.7 37.33 0 100 -0.47 
Buddhism % 820 4.4 0 17.09 0 94.6 4.39 
Muslim % 820 19.22 1.6 33.9 0 100 1.61 
Power distance 820 60.06 63.50 21.26 11.00 104.00 -0.15 
Individualism 820 44.21 39.00 22.69 6.00 91.00 0.22 
Masculinity 820 50.29 52.00 17.98 5.00 110.00 0.05 
Uncertainty avoidance 820 66.13 68.00 22.32 8.00 112.00 -0.26 
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Table 4: Correlations 
  log 
PEN 
log  
DEN 
log 
GDP 
URBAN EDUC log 
HERF 
COMMON PRISK BUDD CHRT MUSLIM PDI IDV MAS UAI 
log PEN 1.00                        
log  DEN 0.85 1.00                       
log GDP 0.62 0.94 1.00                     
URBAN 0.46 0.67 0.70 1.00                    
EDUC 0.44 0.53 0.50 0.46 1.00                  
log HERF -0.03 -0.25 -0.16 -0.26 -0.22 1.00                
COMMON 0.19 0.097 0.05 0.07 0.08 -0.26 1.00               
PRISK 0.63 0.82 0.80 0.46 0.47 -0.06 0.06 1.00              
BUDD -0.04 -0.077 0.08 -0.04 0.03 -0.23 -0.01 0.05 1.00            
CHRT 0.38 0.32 0.20 0.16 0.23 -0.03 -0.01 0.31 -0.35 1.00          
MUSLIM -0.49 -0.41 -0.25 -0.10 -0.32 0.12 -0.10 -0.39 -0.08 -0.67 1.00        
PDI -0.52 -0.56 -0.47 -0.20 -0.38 -0.02 -0.17 -0.56 0.04 -0.22 0.35 1.00      
IDV  0.55 0.63 0.53 0.33 0.39 -0.09 0.17 0.62 -0.21 0.20 -0.21 -0.62 1.00     
MAS  0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.11 -0.10 -0.11 0.15 -0.10 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 0.17 0.07 1.00   
UAI 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.10 0.08 0.07 -0.34 -0.12 -0.04 0.25 -0.01 0.22 -0.24 -0.02 1.00 
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Table 5: Main results 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
log GDP 0.1157***
 
[2.9662] 
0.1301*** 
[3.0991] 
0.0218 
[0.6192] 
0.0536 
[1.3294] 
0.2063*** 
[8.1888] 
URBAN 0.0020 
[1.5478] 
0.0027** 
[2.1381] 
0.0037*** 
[3.0357] 
0.0038*** 
[3.1767] 
 
EDUC 0.0050 
[1.4111] 
0.0001 
[0.0262] 
-0.0031 
[-1.0140] 
-0.0070** 
[-2.3424] 
 
log HERF -0.1389*** 
[-8.1377] 
-0.1244*** 
[-7.9621] 
-0.1577*** 
[-9.8184] 
-0.1405*** 
[-9.2916] 
-0.1372*** 
[-9.5951] 
COMMON 0.1785*** 
[3.9979] 
0.1679*** 
[4.0495] 
0.2105*** 
[5.0518] 
0.1816*** 
[4.7608] 
0.1202*** 
[3.4299] 
PRISK 0.1212*** 
[9.3556] 
0.0917*** 
[6.4124] 
0.1130*** 
[8.9378] 
0.0743*** 
[5.1494] 
 
MUSLIM  -0.0049*** 
[-7.1905] 
 -0.0046*** 
[-6.9966] 
-0.0051*** 
[-8.7280] 
PDI   -0.0069*** 
[-7.1340] 
-0.0054*** 
[-6.0449] 
-0.0046*** 
[-5.1715] 
IDV   0.0023*** 
[2.3541] 
0.0042*** 
[4.6723] 
0.0062*** 
[7.8253] 
MAS   0.0020*** 
[2.6568] 
0.0013* 
[1.9047] 
0.0003 
[0.5302] 
UAI   0.0056*** 
[7.5842] 
0.0048*** 
[6.6737] 
0.0037*** 
[5.4932] 
Constant -1.2439*** 
[-3.4881] 
-1.2420*** 
[-3.3794] 
-0.5872* 
[-1.7608] 
-0.7977*** 
[-2.2679] 
-2.0502*** 
[-8.3769] 
 
Observations 743 743 743 743 766 
R-square 0.544 0.592 0.604 0.645 0.621 
Adjusted R-square 0.534 0.583 0.594 0.635 0.612 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Numbers in brackets show t-
values. Year fixed effects are included but not reported here. 
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Table 6: Importance of cultural variables for low- and high-income countries 
Variable Countries with GDP < $20,000 Countries with GDP > $20,000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
log GDP 0.3167*** 
[6.4680] 
0.2754*** 
[5.7127] 
0.2642*** 
[4.7006] 
0.2422*** 
[4.4162] 
-0.3726*** 
[-5.3900] 
-0.1516*** 
[-2.0560] 
-0.2967*** 
[-4.1125] 
-0.1648** 
[-2.2900] 
URBAN 0.0058*** 
[4.0487] 
0.0063*** 
[4.5148] 
0.0062*** 
[3.7622] 
0.0065*** 
[4.1287] 
-0.0033 
[-1.6399] 
-0.0023 
[-1.1709] 
0.0007 
[0.3760] 
0.0011 
[0.6255] 
EDUC -0.0023 
[-0.5114] 
-0.0078* 
[-1.7491] 
-0.0022 
[-0.4630] 
-0.0074 
[-1.5772] 
0.0265*** 
[5.4414] 
0.0224*** 
[5.0018] 
0.0043 
[0.9485] 
0.0037 
[0.8668] 
log HERF -0.1404*** 
[-6.1687] 
-0.1403*** 
[-6.3488] 
-0.1738*** 
[-6.9385] 
-0.1688*** 
[-6.9599] 
-0.1515*** 
[-7.9082] 
-0.0940*** 
[-4.9214] 
-0.1699*** 
[-8.8582] 
-0.1248*** 
[-5.6855] 
COMMON 0.3963*** 
[6.0875] 
0.3522*** 
[6.0015] 
0.3730*** 
[5.4304] 
0.3189*** 
[5.1642] 
-0.0289 
[-0.5426] 
-0.0120 
[-0.2290] 
-0.0366 
[-1.1346] 
-0.0286 
[-0.8403] 
PRISK 0.1082*** 
[6.8896] 
0.0990*** 
[5.8855] 
0.1208*** 
[7.4432] 
0.1032*** 
[5.5713] 
0.1543*** 
[8.1063] 
0.0884*** 
[3.9089] 
0.0612*** 
[4.0804] 
0.0275* 
[1.6710] 
MUSLIM  -0.0027*** 
[-4.1845] 
 -0.0026*** 
[-3.8591] 
 -0.0070*** 
[-5.5143] 
 -0.0048*** 
[-3.3270] 
PDI   -0.0056*** 
[-4.4327] 
-0.0047*** 
[-3.9603] 
  -0.0083*** 
[-10.4262] 
-0.0066*** 
[-8.6022] 
IDV   -0.0024* 
[-1.8092] 
-0.0007 
[-0.5042] 
  0.0080*** 
[7.2990] 
0.0081*** 
[8.0935] 
MAS   0.0019 
[1.2468] 
0.0006 
[0.3958] 
  0.0010 
[1.2570] 
0.0013* 
[1.7431] 
UAI   0.0004 
[0.3400] 
-0.0000 
[-0.0275] 
  0.0037*** 
[4.9740] 
0.0033*** 
[4.6012] 
Constant -3.2211*** 
[-7.3697] 
-2.7747*** 
[-6.5999] 
-2.4926*** 
[-5.1058] 
-2.2328*** 
[-4.7861] 
3.8686*** 
[5.4914] 
1.8890*** 
[2.6143] 
2.8693*** 
[3.7620] 
1.6226*** 
[2.2549] 
 
Observations 437 437 437 437 306 306 306 306 
R-square 0.563 0.583 0.579 0.594 0.482 0.537 0.660 0.684 
Adjusted R-
square 
0.548 0.567 0.559 0.575 0.456 0.512 0.638 0.661 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Numbers in brackets show t-values.  Year fixed effects are included but not 
reported here.   
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Table 7: Robustness Tests 
Variable (1) 
Fama - 
MacBeth 
(2) 
Cluster 
(3) 
Robust 
(4) 
Random Effect 
(5) 
log Density 
(6) 
Full model 
log GDP 0.0522*** 
[3.8226] 
0.0536 
[0.4563] 
0.0673* 
[1.8748] 
0.4731*** 
[8.0228] 
1.0278*** 
[23.4750] 
0.0513 
[1.2589] 
URBAN 0.0037*** 
[7.7224] 
0.0038 
[1.1036] 
0.0026** 
[2.0948] 
-0.0095*** 
[-3.4852] 
0.0047*** 
[3.0925] 
0.0039*** 
[3.1628] 
EDUC -0.0070*** 
[-10.8002] 
-0.0070 
[-0.8158] 
-0.0059** 
[-1.9640] 
-0.0067 
[-1.4791] 
-0.0064** 
[-2.2020] 
-0.0070** 
[-2.3116] 
log HERF -0.1404*** 
[-17.7439] 
-0.1405*** 
[-3.3076] 
-0.1529*** 
[-9.1308] 
-0.0953*** 
[-5.5173] 
-0.1402*** 
[-8.9362] 
-0.1376*** 
[-8.5663] 
COMMON 0.1832*** 
[10.7596] 
0.1816 
[1.6405] 
0.1516*** 
[3.5018] 
0.1324 
[1.0403] 
0.1529*** 
[3.9138] 
0.1840*** 
[4.7148] 
PRISK 0.0758*** 
[14.3902] 
0.0743* 
[1.8868] 
0.0681*** 
[4.8937] 
-0.0182* 
[-1.9518] 
0.0868*** 
[6.1658] 
0.0730*** 
[4.9608] 
BUDD      0.0007 
[0.9287] 
CHRT      0.0002 
[0.3832] 
MUSLIM -0.0046*** 
[-29.5030] 
-0.0046** 
[-2.3311] 
-0.0043*** 
[-8.1960] 
-0.0053*** 
[-3.4660] 
-0.0050*** 
[-7.8277] 
-0.0045*** 
[-5.9637] 
PDI -0.0054*** 
[-25.6736] 
-0.0054** 
[-2.0527] 
-0.0055*** 
[-5.4042] 
-0.0022 
[-0.7049] 
-0.0044*** 
[-4.9851] 
-0.0054*** 
[-6.0208] 
IDV 0.0041*** 
[12.8375] 
0.0042 
[1.5902] 
0.0043*** 
[4.2244] 
0.0065** 
[2.2632] 
0.0052*** 
[5.5859] 
0.0044*** 
[4.6321] 
MAS 0.0013*** 
[7.8352] 
0.0013 
[0.6594] 
0.0014 
[1.5237] 
-0.0008 
[-0.2846] 
0.0012* 
[1.8171] 
0.0013* 
[1.8445] 
UAI 0.0048*** 
[27.7609] 
0.0048** 
[2.2503] 
0.0047*** 
[6.1447] 
0.0035 
[1.5245] 
0.0044*** 
[6.3997] 
0.0047*** 
[6.2376] 
Constant -0.7270*** 
[-7.3596] 
-0.7977 
[-0.7745] 
-0.8808*** 
[-2.8170] 
-3.8818*** 
[-6.7815] 
-5.2928*** 
[-14.7376] 
-0.8001** 
[-2.2369] 
 
Observations 743 743 743 743 743 743 
R-square 0.647 0.645 0.617  0.936 0.645 
Adjusted R-
square 
 0.635 0.606  0.934 0.634 
Pseudo R-
square 
   0.558   
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Numbers in brackets show t-
values. Year fixed effects are included but not reported here. 
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Figure 1A: Relationship between Log (GDP) and Log (Penetration), all countries 
 
Note: Correlation between Log (GDP) and Log (penetration): 0.638 
 
Figure 1B: Relationship between Log (GDP) and Log (Penetration), developed countries  
 
Note: Correlation between Log (GDP) and Log (penetration): 0.081 
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